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Constructivists, such as Harvey Brown, urge that the geometry of Newtonian and 
special relativistic spacetimes results from the properties of matter. Whatever this 
may mean, it commits constructivists to the claim that these spacetime geometries 
can be inferred from the properties of matter without recourse to spatiotemporal 
presumptions or with few of them. I argue that the construction project only 
succeeds if constructivists antecedently presume the essential commitments of a 
realist conception of spacetime. These commitments can be avoided only by 
adopting an extreme form of operationalism. 
                                                
1 I am grateful for discussion to John Earman, Nick Huggett, Ben Jantzen and Ed Slowik; and to 
members of the seminar HPS 2534 General Relativity and Gravitation, Fall 2007, Department of 
History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh. Revisions of a first draft benefited 
greatly from the symposium “Time and Relativity,” Institute for Advanced Study, University of 
Minnesota, October 25-27, 2007, and from discussion with all its participants. They included 
Katherine Brading, Michel Janssen, Antigone Nounou, Oliver Pooley, Chris Smeenk and 
especially Harvey Brown, who endured my persistent interrogation with patience and good 
cheer. However the formulations presented here of Brown’s views on space, time and matter are 
my own. 
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1. Introduction 
 In his Physical Relativity: Space-time Structure from a Dynamical Perspective, Harvey 
Brown (2005) advocates a constructive approach to spacetime theories. The idea is that 
spacetime theories are essentially matter theories. The familiar spacetime geometries are 
dependent on properties of matter and induced by them. For example, he urges (pp. vii-viii) that 
“relativistic phenomena like length contraction and time dilation are in the last analysis the result 
of structural properties of the quantum theory of matter.” Elsewhere2 (p.132) he describes the 
view “defended in this book” as “one is committed to the idea that Lorentz contraction is the 
result of a structural property of the forces responsible for the microstructure of matter,” that  
The appropriate structure is Minkowski geometry precisely because the laws of physics 
of the non-gravitational interactions are Lorentz covariant. 
and apparently endorses the idea that “these forces and structures are, indeed, actually 
responsible for the phenomena, and, hence for space-time having the structure it has.”  
 There is an ambiguity in the use of the terms central to Brown’s claim: “result of,” 
“because” and “responsible for.” They may be understood in two ways. First, they may carry an 
explanatory import, so that we are to look to matter theory for an explanation of why spacetime 
has the structure it has. This is understanding that one finds most easily in the text. There is a 
strong and frequent emphasis on explanation3 and the urging that this explanatory order should 
not be reversed. (See Section “8.2 Minkowski Spacetime: The Cart or the Horse”.) 
 There is also a second stronger reading. The terms may carry ontological import. Then 
spacetime results from matter in the sense that spacetime structures are all really properties of 
matter; or, more carefully, spacetime supervenes on matter. An important consequence of that 
supervenience is that there can be no differences in spacetime structure without differences in the 
                                                
2 Or again (p.8) he reports Bell’s attempt at “demonstrating with an appropriate model that a 
moving rod contracts and a moving clock dilates, because of how it is made up and not because 
of the nature of its spatio-temporal environment. Bell was surely right.” (Brown’s emphasis here 
and in main text.) 
3 For example, see also pp. 139-143 for Section 8.3 “What does Absolute Geometry Explain?” 
and “what is at issue is the arrow of explanation” (p. 142). 
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underlying matter. This reading is harder to find, but it is there. Brown asserts (p. 141)“…the 
space-time structures [of Newtonian theory and special relativity] … are not real entities in their 
own right at all” and (p. 142); that the 4-connection of these theories is “a codification of certain 
key aspects of the behaviour of particles and fields”; and (p. 100) that “I see the absolute 
geometrical structures of Minkowski space-time as parasitic on the relativistic properties of the 
dynamical matter fields.” These sentiments are captured more vividly in the earlier slogan of 
Brown and Pooley (2004) of Minkowski spacetime as a “glorious non-entity.” This would make 
Brown’s view a form of spacetime relationism, although I will suggest below in Section 6 that it 
might be more restrictive than familiar forms of relationism.  
 Brown’s readers will decide for themselves how these two claims interact. A natural 
possibility is that the supervenience claim is the fundamental one; and that the explanatory 
claims are intended to defend it by denying explanatory power to structures of space, time or 
spacetime geometries. 
 Since many details of Brown’s text have been addressed elsewhere (for example, Dorato, 
2007, Martinez, 2007 and Skow, 2006), my concern in the present note is with just one issue. It 
is to explore whether the sort of constructivism Brown advocates is a viable alternative to the 
standard view.  Whatever meanings may be intended for the terms mentioned, if the claims are to 
harbor interesting novelty, they must differ significantly from what I shall label a standard 
“realist” view of spacetime. In the case of special relativity, that view amounts to: 
Realist conception of Minkowski spacetime.4 
(a) There exists a four-dimensional spacetime that can be coordinatized by the standard 
coordinates (x, y, z, t) 
(b) The spatiotemporal interval s between events (x, y, z, t) and (X, Y, Z, T) is a property 
of the spacetime, independent of the matter it contains, and is given by 
s2 = (t-T)2 – (x-X)2 – (y-Y)2 – (z-Z)2                                  (1) 
                                                
4 I use the older formalism since it is enables me to make my points most compactly. A similar 
development is possible using a more abstract, geometrical approach in which a Minkowski 
spacetime metric is explicitly introduced. I do not see any gain, however, in this case from its 
greater complexity. 
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When s2>0, the interval s corresponds to times elapsed on an ideal clock; when  s2<0, the 
interval s corresponds to spatial distances measured by ideal rods (both employed in the 
standard way). 
(c) Material clocks and rods measure these times and distances because the matter 
theories that govern them are adapted to the independent geometry of this spacetime. 
If constructivism is to be novel, it must contradict this view; it certainly cannot covertly presume 
all or most of it. 
 What I will seek to establish below is that if constructivism is to succeed, it must tacitly 
presume at least a major part of this realist conception. To show this I will recall that this 
constructivism depends upon a technical result that is assumed tacitly in Brown’s book. It is that 
familiar spacetime geometry can indeed be constructed—that is, inferred—from matter theories. 
For, if that is not possible, there will be components of spacetime geometry that do not supervene 
on matter and also cannot be explained by matter theories; that is, they would not, in the 
language of Brown’s text, be a “result of” properties of matter. I will show below that, once one 
attends to the details of this construction project, it can only succeed if one tacitly assumes much 
or all of the realist conception. 
 The construction project will be indicated by sketching its first steps in Sections 2 and 3 
below. In Section 4, I will advance my first claim: 
The construction project must tacitly assume an already existing spacetime endowed with 
topological properties, for otherwise it has no way to introduce spatiotemporal coincidences. 
In Section 5, I will advance the second claim: 
The Lorentz covariance of all matter theories asserts an adaptation between matter and this 
spacetime akin to the realist’s (c), although without (c)’s presumption of the direction of the 
adaptation of matter to spacetime. 
In Section 6, I will advance the third claim: 
Constructivists must accept that spatial distances and times elapsed are properties of 
spacetime as asserted in (b), on pain failing to reconstruct traditional spacetime geometry and 
also having to accept an extreme form of operationism in which quantities have values only 
if they are actually measured. 
The claims made and the discussion throughout will be limited to Newtonian theory and special 
relativity. For once one makes the transition to general relativity, the distinction between matter 
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and spacetime becomes harder to draw; the spacetime metric now represents both the geometric 
properties of spacetime as well as the gravitational field. 
 Finally, the discussion below will eschew the explanatory issues that have dominated 
discussion elsewhere. For they seem only to lead to futile disputes over just what it means to 
explain, over which is the better explanation and, most opaquely, which is the “real” explanation. 
While a full understanding of constructivism may eventually require clarification of these 
explanatory concepts, my goal here is to show that we can advance our analysis of 
constructivism by paying attention to its non-explanatory aspects.5 
2. The Construction Project 
 The strongest form of constructivism presumes the success of the following project, 
which has been specialized to special relativity for concreteness: 
Construction of Minkowski spacetime. It is possible to recover the geometry of 
Minkowski spacetime from Lorentz covariant matter theories devoid of spatiotemporal 
presumptions. 
The essential condition in this specification is that the matter theories must be devoid of 
spatiotemporal assumptions. Without it we would, to one degree or another, simply be returning 
                                                
5 To see how rapidly these concerns lead to stalemates, consider how we might explain the 
puzzle posed in Brown (p. 24) that free particles in relativity theory follow spacetime geodesics. 
If we demand a causal explanation that draws on a primitive notion of causation, then we are 
conjuring up a dubious level of causal metaphysics that must be supposed to be antecedent to 
science. Successful explication of that notion of cause has eluded us for millennia (Norton, 
2003). Or we may understand the use of causal language as merely a gloss on the use of a deeper 
theory. In conformity with this latter view, Brown (pp. 161-63) offers as an explanation the 
deduction of the geodesic principle from the law of conservation of matter in general relativity. 
That renders the view of explanation deductive-nomological. Then our judgments of which are 
the better explanation may dissolve into disputes over which explanans has fewer assumptions. 
To balance Minkowski geometry’s one assumption, is the competing “brute fact” (p. 143) of the 
Lorentz covariance of all matter theories one assumption or many, one for each matter theory? 
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spatiotemporal notions presumed at the start. The more that a version of constructivism presumes 
spacetime notions, the less it differs from the realist view. 
 For this strong form, it is easy to envisage what a stripped down matter theory, devoid of 
spatiotemporal notions, would look like. Take any Lorentz covariant matter theory expressed in 
the standard coordinates (x, y, z, t) of (1), such as Maxwell’s electrodynamics, Dirac’s electon 
theory or the quantum field theory of selected interactions. Discard all spatiotemporal 
presumptions and interpretations for these coordinates. They are now merely parameters whose 
meaning is given entirely by their role in the particular matter theory in which they appear. Since 
we have many matter theories that I will conventionally number 1, 2, 3, …, we should indicate to 
which matter theory a set of four parameters belongs by using subscripts: 
(x1, y1, z1, t1), (x2, y2, z2, t2), (x3, y3, z3, t3), … 
 The presumption that will be key to the reconstruction is the Lorentz covariance of all 
matter theories. It is a “brute fact,” according to Brown (p. 143).6 It asserts that the equations of 
each matter theory remain unchanged under a Lorentz transformation of the parameters. This 
group includes 
ti’ = γ(ti – vxi)      xi’ = γ(xi – vti)      yi’ = yi      zi’ = zi                            (2a) 
where γ = (1-v2)-1/2 and v is an arbitrary parameter such that -1 < v < 1; spatiotemporal 
translations 
ti’ = ti – T      xi’ = xi – X      yi’ = yi – Y      zi’ = zi – Z                          (2b) 
 where T, X, Y, Z are arbitrary constants; and spatial rotations. There is a corresponding 
transformation for the other quantities, such as field intensities, of the matter theory. For 
notational convenience, we denote these quantities communally as “Qi(xi, yi, zi, ti)” for the i-th 
matter theory. Their transformation rule is 
Qi’(xi’, yi’, zi’, ti’)  = L(v) Qi(xi, yi, zi, ti)                                              (2c) 
for L(v) a suitable operator. 
 This is the familiar “passive” formulation of Lorentz covariance. It is equivalent to the 
“active” form, which will be more useful below. To arrive at it, presume that we have some 
                                                
6 “In the dynamical approach to length contraction and time dilation…, the Lorentz covariance  
of all the fundamental laws of physics is an unexplained brute fact.” 
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configuration of structures Qi(xi, yi, zi, ti) admitted by the i-th matter theory. It follows that 
Qi’(xi’, yi’, zi’, ti’), where transformed parameters are used, is also admitted by the i-th matter 
theory. All that is needed for this admission is the appropriate functional dependence of the 
quantities Qi’ on the parameters xi’, yi’, zi’, ti’. So we learn that the same structures Qi’(xi, yi, zi, 
ti), now considered as functions of the original parameters xi, yi, zi, ti, are also admitted by the i-
th matter theory. This Qi’ is the Lorentz boost of the original Qi and both are related to the same 
parameter set (xi, yi, zi, ti). Informally, the new structure is just the old one “boosted into motion 
at speed v in the x direction,” but that interpretation is not yet available since we have not yet 
constructed spatiotemporal quantities. 
3. Clocks 
 How is the construction process to proceed? The simplest way is to identify structures 
within a matter theory that perform as clocks and rods and show that they induce the spacetime 
interval (1). That simple approach will not always be possible. Some matter theories do not 
straightforwardly admit clock-like or rod-like structures. An example is Maxwell’s 
electrodynamics, for none of its localized structures are stable. It must be coupled with another 
theory to produce such structures. We might also wonder how the structures might arise in 
quantum field theory. 
 For expediency, let us just assume the simple case, that our matter theory does admit 
stable clocks and rods. In that case, a clock “at rest” (speaking informally only, since the 
spatiotemporal notions of rest and motion have not yet been defined) in matter theory 1 is this. It 
is a localized structure “Clock (x1, y1, z1, t1),” in the sense that it is associated with a small range 
of parameter values (x1, y1, z1), and its states cycle with a period τ as a function of t. That is 
Clock (x1, y1, z1, t1+ τ) = Clock (x1, y1, z1, t1) 
for all t1. Consider the straight7 segment of a spacetime curve connecting points (x1, y1, z1, t1) 
and (x1, y1, z1, t1+T), for any T. This clock will assign a time T/ τ interval to it. Without loss of 
generality, we can rescale these time assignments to agree with coordinate differences simply by 
                                                
7 That is, the curve whose image points are {(x1, y1, z1, αt1) + (x1, y1, z1, (1-α)(t1+T)): 0≤α≤1}. 
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multiplying by τ. This merely amounts to the selection of a conventional unit of measure. So we 
infer 
Temporal interval from (x1, y1, z1, t1) to (x1, y1, z1, t1+T) = T 
From the active form of Lorentz covariance, it now follows8 that the same time interval must be 
assigned to the Lorentz boost of this segment. So we have 
Temporal interval from (γ(x1 – vt1), y1, z1, γ(x1 – vt1)) to 
(γ(x1 – v(t1+T)), y1, z1, γ(x1 – v(t1+T))) = T 
A short piece of algebra affirms that these two assignments of temporal interval conform to the 
expression (1) for the spacetime interval. Suitable combinations of Lorentz boosts, translations 
and rotations enable recovery of the full content of the expression (1) for the spacetime interval 
for the case of s2>0. Informally speaking, that case is the metrical structure of the future and past 
light cone. 
 This construction is quite robust. We could have used clocks from other matter theories—
matter theories 2, 3, … —and returned the same result as long as we calibrate them to use the 
same units. Analogously we could construct physical rods and recover the remainder of the 
expression (1) for the spatiotemporal interval. 
4. The Spacetime Presumed 
 Congenial as the sketch of the last section has been, we have progressed much too fast. 
Buried within it, in one form or another, is most if not all of the realist’s conception of 
Minkowski spacetime. To begin, the construction presumes that the parameters of each matter 
theory (x1, y1, z1, t1), (x2, y2, z2, t2), (x3, y3, z3, t3), … refer to the same events of spacetime. For 
example, we presume that clocks from different matter theories will return the same expression 
(1) for the spacetime interval. That presumes that the origin of the parameters (x1, y1, z1, t1) = (0, 
                                                
8 Some details for this inference: The Lorentz transformation (2c) assures us that the clock 
system will execute the same number of periods in the original and boosted segment. We 
presume that times assigned to a segment are scalars. As a result, the quantity dT/dα, where α is 
defined in the previous note, is also a scalar and is the quantity Qi of the earlier definition of 
active Lorentz covariance. 
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0, 0, 0) of matter theory 1 refers to the same event in spacetime as the origin of the parameters 
(x2, y2, z2, t2) = (0, 0, 0, 0) of matter theory 2. So, for example, we could have a clock from 
matter theory 1 measure the temporal interval from the event (0, 0, 0, 0) to (x, 0, 0, t) and clock 
from matter theory 2 measure the temporal interval along the segment from the same event (0, 0, 
0, 0) to (-x, 0, 0, t). 
 This presumption of sameness of referent for the two sets of parameters amounts to a 
notion of spacetime coincidence of the associated systems. Nothing in the specification of the 
construction project of Section 2 licensed that notion of spacetime coincidence. For to presume 
spacetime coincidences is to presume spatiotemporal notions that were explicitly disavowed. 
 To see that the presumption of spacetime coincidences is contingent and cannot be 
presumed, consider the case of the internal spin spaces of two spin half particles. Each particle 
will have parameters associated with it that pick out a point in its own internal spin space. The 
equality of the parameters, does not amount to a coincidence of the particles. The equality just 
indicates an equality of their spin angular momenta. 
 One might imagine two responses. First, one might wonder whether spacetime 
coincidences are recoverable for two distinct matter fields through their interactions. Imagine 
that their combined Hamiltonian includes a distance based coupling term. Might that justify the 
notion that each of their parameters designate the same events in spacetime? For they interact 
more intensely the more closely they approach in spacetime. The same example of internal spin 
spaces shows us that this inference does not succeed. It is standard to write spin-spin coupling 
terms in Hamiltonians, where the coupling energy depends on the closeness of the spin 
parameters, without thereby assuming that sameness of the parameters betokens spatiotemporal 
coincidence. In any case, interactions are of no help if we consider two fields that do not interact; 
we cannot, on these grounds, preclude the possibility that each inhabits its own spacetime. 
 Second, one might wonder if we should not just formulate all actual matter theories 
(including those presently unknown to us) from the start with just one set of parameters (x, y, z, 
t). Then, every time these parameters appear in the context of one or other type of matter, they 
are always the same parameters. Therefore, they must have the same referent. This escape fails 
as well, for it simply presumes that the properties of matter are such that all of its forms can 
employ the very same parameter set (x, y, z, t). As a contingent fact, that is correct if these 
parameters are spacetime coordinates. However a contingent fact like this cannot presumed in 
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advance if one is disavowing all spatiotemporal notions and seeking to infer them. In the case of 
the internal spin space, one could not use just one parameter set for the two distinct spin spaces 
of two particles, or at least not without some device that distinguishes the internal space to which 
each belongs. 
 Hence the strongest form of the construction project sketched in Section 2 above fails. 
One cannot recover the unique four-dimensional spacetime (a) of the realist’s conception of 
spacetime except by presuming it at the start. In effect, all the constructions of Section 3 
presumed a single spacetime with topological properties and coordinates (x, y, z, t). This does 
not augur well for constructivists who seriously believe that Minkowski spacetime is a “glorious 
non-entity.” 
5. Lorentz Covariance is a Property of a Matter Theory and 
Spacetime 
 The all-important “brute fact” of Lorentz covariance of all matter theories is not simply 
the expression of a property of matter. Rather it is the expression of a property of matter and 
spacetime taken together, a statement of a relation between them. For, in the mode of 
presentation adopted here, Lorentz covariance is a restriction on how matter may depend 
functionally on the parameters (x, y, z, t), where these parameters have now been revealed to be 
particular sorts of coordinates of a spacetime. 
 To say it differently, the Lorentz covariance of all matter theories expresses a property of 
mutual adaptation of the matter and the spacetime. This condition is close to the condition (c) of 
the realist’s conception of Minkowski spacetime in Section 1. Where (c) is stronger in that it 
specifies a direction of adaptation: in its metrical properties, matter is adapted to spacetime. We 
shall see in the next section that this directed adaptation is difficult for constructivists to avoid. 
6. Spatial Distances and Times Elapsed are Properties of 
Spacetime 
 The Lorentz covariance of matter theories is really a property of matter and spacetime 
taken together. What of the spatial distances and time elapsed that are recovered from the 
requirement of Lorentz covariance? Are they properties of spacetime, of matter, or of both? 
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 Very familiar results strongly suggest—but do not prove—that the spatial distances and 
times elapsed are properties of the spacetime and that the matter of a Lorentz covariant matter 
theory is merely an instrument used to measure them. The result is that the construction of the 
metrical structure of a Minkowski spacetime (1) by means of Lorentz covariance, such as in 
Section 3 above, depends upon no particular feature of the matter theories governing the clocks 
and rods. We needed nothing from the matter theory beyond its Lorentz covariance and that the 
theory can assign a scalar magnitude to just one segment of spacetime. It then follows that that 
the only admissible metrical structure is (1). 
 This is evident already in the construction of Section 3. For, let a matter theory assign by 
any means at all, unit time elapsed to the segment joining (0, 0, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0, 1). If that 
matter theory is Lorentz covariant, then assignments of times must be preserved under Lorentz 
boosts as well as spatiotemporal translations and spatial rotations. These transformations can be 
used to populate the spacetime and, as before, we recover the expression for the spatiotemporal 
interval (1), at least for the future and past light cones.9 
 These results are familiar since they reproduce a line of argument extending back to 
Einstein. A recent, persuasive formulation of the argument form is found in Janssen’s notion of a 
common origin inference or “COI” (Janssen, 2003; Balashov and Janssen, 2003). Reasoning 
with COIs is commonplace. When we see many identical footprints on the sandy beach, we 
immediately infer to the existence of the foot that produced them, their common origin. We do 
not declare the presence of the many footprints a brute fact beyond which we cannot infer. When 
we find that every planet orbits the sun under the influence of an inverse square law, we infer to 
their common origin, a potential field that fills the space around the sun, even those parts where 
there are no planets. Similarly when all matter theories return spatio-temporal measurements all 
                                                
9 To complete the populating of the spacetime, one needs one further property, the summation 
property that the time elapsed along a segment AC is equal to the sum of the times elapsed along 
segments AB and BC, where B is an event on the segment between A and C. Divide the segment 
(0, 0, 0, 0) to (0, 0, 0, 1), say, to n parts (0, 0, 0, 0,) to (0, 0, 0, 1/n); (0, 0, 0, 1/n) to (0, 0, 0, 2/n); 
… . It now follows by application of time translation (2b) that all n parts have the same time 
elapsed interval; from summation that they sum to 1; and therefore that the time elapsed in each 
is 1/n. 
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of which conform to a Minkowski spacetime geometry, that is strong evidence that they have a 
single, common origin, the Minkowski spacetime that they are measuring. 
 Thus, when one sees the near complete independence of the spatial distances and times 
elapsed from the specifics of the matter theories, it is hard to resist the realist’s assertion (b) that 
these spaces and times are properties of the spacetime and that (c) matter is merely providing a 
means of measuring these properties. 
 A determined constructivist can resist, but only at some cost. That cost comes through the 
need to renounce a major part of the goal of the construction project and, worse, to commit to an 
extreme form of operationism in which quantities are declared to have no values unless they are 
actually measured. 
 To see this, imagine some part of spacetime that is either devoid of matter or hosts a 
static matter distribution. In this part of spacetime, we can select two non-coincident timelike 
separated events A and B such that nothing changes as we pass along the straight segment of 
spacetime connecting them. In the ordinary realist’s conception, we would say that some time 
elapses between them. What can a constructivist say? There are no material clocks actually 
present measuring the time elapsed. For there is either no matter present or no change in the 
matter present as we pass from A to B. So the constructivist has no material basis for the 
recovery of a time change. If times elapsed are to supervene on matter, or more vaguely to be a 
result of the properties of matter, then the absence of any change in the matter entails that there is 
no change in times elapsed.10 
 At best the constructivist can say that, counterfactually, had a clock been transported to 
this part of spacetime and allowed to pass between the events, then it would have read the 
appropriate time elapsed. If the constructivist’s account of time elapsed depends upon these 
counterfactual scenarios, then of what is the time elapsed a property? Properties, such as elapsed 
                                                
10 What of the t parameter introduced in Section 2 above? Is it the time elapsed in the usual 
sense of Minkowski spacetime geometry for this static case? It is not. Since the t parameter was 
introduced with no antecedent temporal meaning, we must allow the possibility that changes in it 
correspond to no physical changes. If times elapsed are to be a result of the properties of matter, 
then the fact that the properties of the matter are the same for all values of t entails that there is 
no physical change associated with changes of t. 
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times, must be carried by something. The fictional clock envisaged is no real thing, but merely 
something that could have been. 
 The time elapsed is a property of spatiotemporal segment connecting the events A and B, 
just as the realist asserts in (b). It is the only thing there to bear the property.11 
 It seems to me that a constructivist has one escape. That is to deny that any time does 
elapse between events A and B. The constructivist must, in effect, say that the entire scenario 
envisaged is impossible. The notion that there can be a part of spacetime without matter or a part 
of spacetime with static matter is simply a confusion on the part of realists. It makes no sense to 
talk of time in such scenarios.12 
 To adopt this escape commits the constructivists to renouncing a significant part of 
spacetime theory. In ordinary physical theorizing, it is not uncommon to talk of parts of 
Minkowski spacetimes empty of matter. Correspondingly, a familiar, elementary case is a 
Minkowski spacetime harboring a single electric charge and its associated electrostatic field. 
Both of these must be dismissed as confusions. Many more such standard examples must be 
dismissed as confusions. Imagine a Minkowski spacetime with two non-interacting, identical 
clocks in it, at relative rest. It is standard to assume that they tick at the same rate, even though 
no material processes implement that fact. It could be expressed materially if we found that light 
signals emitted from the first clock at times 1, 2, 3, … arrived at the second at times 100, 101, 
102, …; and conversely. But there are no such light signals to carry the property of agreement of 
                                                
11 If one presumes that spatial distances must be measured by rods that have some spatial 
inhomogeneity corresponding, say, to the markings on a ruler or the joins between successively 
laid out rulers, then an analogous problem can be described for spatial distances. 
12 Brown (p. 101) seems to assert that there can be no time without material change. He writes 
that “Time, at its most fundamental level, has something to do with change, and change is not an 
obvious feature of the Malament world [which has an inertial worldline and Minkowski causal 
structure only].” Also: “The conformal light-cone structure is in itself timeless. It has no non-
trivial dynamics.” 
14 
rates and, apparently, no way to assign constructive meaning to it.13 The realist, however, 
understands their ticking at the same rate merely to amount to their measuring the common time 
they inhabit. 
 The outcome is that the constructivist is not reconstructing our familiar spacetime 
geometry; the constructivist is extensively correcting it. The corrections are stronger than a 
spacetime relationist might require. For the latter, time can still exist in a spacetime filled with a 
static matter distribution. Time exists as relation between the matter of identical time slices; it 
does not have to be induced by material changes between the timeslices. What justification can 
the constructivist give for the corrections? The assertion must be that it makes no sense to speak 
of times elapsed unless a clock or the change in some material process actually measures the 
times elapsed. This is the extreme form of operationism mentioned. 
 If constructivists do not adopt this extreme view, then times elapsed and spatial distances 
must be recognized as properties of spacetime. It now follows that the adaptation between matter 
and spacetime discussed in Section 5 is an adaptation of matter to spacetime, as (c) of the 
realist’s conception asserts. 
7. Conclusion 
 If constructivists are to succeed in their project of fully reconstructing familiar spacetime 
geometries from matter theories, then they must presume the basic views of the realist 
conception of spacetime, which amounts to a complete failure of the project. They can only 
avoid this failure by offering to reconstruct just a part of the familiar spacetime geometry and 
dismissing the remaining part as an illicit confusion through an extreme form of operationism. 
 The analysis above took as its target a thorough-going form of constructivism. One can 
certainly conceive more modest versions that presume some spatiotemporal notions and not 
others, although the resulting constructivist view becomes less interesting the more 
spatiotemporal properties it assumes. A natural, partial view might accept the topological space 
(a) of the realist’s conception, but none of the metrical properties of (b) and (c). Nonetheless, the 
                                                
13 In conformity with this last conclusion, Brown (p. 20) finds that there is no privileged notion 
of simultaneity between free particles in Newtonian theory. “It follows that Newtonian 
simultaneity is a by-product of the introduction of forces into the theory.” 
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same pressures described will drive that more modest constructivist to the realist’s (b) and (c) as 
well. 
 In addition, advocates of any such partial view must establish that the selection of 
spatiotemporal presumptions is consistently done. For example, one could probably not posit that 
rest lengths of rods are properties of the spacetime, but that contractions of moving rods are 
properties of the matter of the rods. For positing the former may well commit the theorist to the 
latter as a property of the spacetime. The burden of showing consistency lies with the 
constructivist. 
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